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Economic theory suggests that unfettered international capital flows can foster a more 
efficient allocation of resources, provide opportunities for risk diversification, and help 
promote financial development. In recognition of these potential benefits, governments of 
industrial countries have undertaken widespread capital account liberalization over the past 
quarter-century. Many attribute efficiency gains, increased diversification opportunities, and 
financial development in these countries to opening up capital markets. 
A natural policy prescription, therefore, is to extend this process of international 
financial integration to other, economically less developed, countries.
1 But this view has been 
quite controversial. Some argue that, while capital account liberalization is desirable, it is 
important to proceed slowly.
2 Others question the desirability of unfettered capital flows 
regardless of the liberalization process since, on the grounds that unregulated capital flows 
could facilitate the occurrence and spreading of currency crises.
3  
                                                 
1 The benefits of open capital markets were stressed by Lawrence Summers in his 2000 
Richard T. Ely Lecture to the American Economic Association when he said “…to the extent 
that international financial integration represents an improvement in financial 
intermediation,... [perhaps] because institutions involved in the transfer of capital across 
jurisdictions improve efficiency with which capital is allocated, it offers a potentially 
significant increase in economic efficiency.” (p. 3) 
 
2 For example in the Report of the Managing Director to the International Monetary and 
Financial Committee on Progress in Strengthening the Architecture of the International 
Financial System and Reform of the IMF it is written “In a number of discussions in recent 
years on issues related to capital account issues, the Executive Board has emphasized the 
substantial benefits of capital account liberalization, but stressed the need to carefully 
manage and sequence liberalization in order to minimize risks.” 
3 In an influential article in Foreign Affairs, Bhagwati (1998) argued that “substantial gains 
[from capital controls] have been asserted, not demonstrated …” (p. 7).  
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Given the potential importance of countries’ policies on capital account liberalization 
and the different lessons one might draw based upon which articles one reads in this 
expanding literature, it seems an opportune time to review the evidence. In this paper we 
survey the literature on the links between capital account liberalization and economic 
performance with a focus on the empirical cross-country studies of the effects of capital 
account liberalization on growth. 
One source of the debate on the role of capital account liberalization is the mixed set 
of empirical results derived in the literature. A possible reason for this ambiguity arises from 
the difficulty in identifying and quantifying capital account liberalization in a consistent 
manner across a wide set of countries. Consequently, different studies have applied different 
empirical measures. Another reason for differences in empirical results is that, while most 
studies start with essentially the same benchmark cross-country growth model, there is 
divergence with respect to the set of countries included in the analysis, the sample period that 
is investigated, the dataset employed, and the estimation technique applied. In order to 
provide an informative comparison of the various contributions made in the literature, we 
undertake an empirical analysis to investigate the sensitivity of results to the measure of 
capital account openness, country coverage, and econometric methods. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes and presents 
different measures of capital account openness.  The presentation of these indicators shows 
the extent of capital account liberalization across the world over the past quarter century.  
The description of these indicators is also an important precursor to our summary of the 
empirical literature on capital account liberalization and economic growth in Section III. 
Section III compares and contrasts contributions to this literature.  We note how these studies  
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differ with respect to data, methods and results.  These differences hamper comparison across 
studies.  Therefore, in Section IV, we attempt to reconcile some of the differences by 
presenting results using different indicators of capital account openness in a common data 
set.  In that section, we investigate the sensitivity of the estimated effect of capital account 
liberalization on economic growth to the use of different indicators of liberalization, to the 
set of countries used in the analysis, and to the econometric methods employed.  The new 
estimates presented in Section IV provide evidence that capital account liberalization 
promotes growth, but the significance of this effect varies across regions.  Section V offers 
some concluding remarks. 
 
I.    MEASURES OF CAPITAL ACCOUNT RESTRICTIONS 
A natural starting point for any data-based discussion of the consequences of capital 
account liberalization is a review of different empirical measures of capital liberalization that 
have been employed to gauge whether a country allows the free flow of capital across its 
borders. In practice, there are few indicators of capital account restrictions available across a 
wide cross-section of countries. Most measures are qualitative and rules-based, though there 
has been some attempt to go beyond an on/off categorization by reflecting the intensity with 
which controls are imposed.  
Two of the most widely used capital account restriction measures draw on data 
assembled by the IMF and published annually since 1950 in its Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). We begin by discussing these rules 
based indicators. We then present some alternative methods of dating stock market 
liberalization. Following this, we consider recent quantitative measures. We conclude this  
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section with a short discussion of the efficacy of efforts to limit capital flows, a topic that is 
important when considering the relationship between de jure measures of capital account 
controls and the de facto effects of these controls. 
Table 1 provides a summary of the measures of capital account controls and capital 
account liberalization. This summary table will facilitate comparing and contrasting the 
indicators discussed in this section. Each row of this table corresponds to one of the 
indicators. The first column presents the name of the indicator that we will use in our 
discussion of the determinants of growth below. The second column provides the source of 
the indicator, referring either to an article where the indicator is first presented or to a 
publication whose issues can be used to construct the indicator. Columns 3 through 6 of the 
table present a brief description of the indicator, the range of values the indicator takes, the 
years covered and the countries covered by the indicator.  
 
A.   Rules-Based Measures 
IMF Measures 
Every issue of the International Monetary Fund’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions published between 1967 (which refers to 
conditions in 1966) and 1996 (which refers to conditions in 1995) includes a summary table 
in which a single row directly addresses the presence of capital controls; line E.2, labeled 
“Restrictions on payments for capital transactions.”
4 The information in this row has been the 
                                                 
4 The set of categories that reflect the presence of capital controls expanded with the 1997 
issue of Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
 with the 
specification of 13 categories including, for the first time, a distinction between restrictions 
(continued…)  
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basis for generating an indicator of the existence of rules or restrictions that inhibit cross-
border capital flows or discriminate on the basis of citizenship or residence of transacting 
agents. (Table 1, Row 1) 
 
Share Measure 
A standard way to use the information from line E.2 of the International Monetary 
Fund’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions is to construct, 
for each country, a variable reflecting the proportion of years in which countries had 
liberalized capital accounts. We call this variable Share (Table 1, Row 2).
5 For example, if 
the AREAER judged capital markets open for five years out of a 10-year period, then the 
openness measure Share would be 0.5. A potential problem with this approach is that a value 
of Share equal to 0.5 is consistent with a situation where a country had open capital markets 
for the first five years of a decade, for the last five years of a decade, for every other year of a 
decade, or for many other on-again, off-again patterns. In practice, however, as shown in 
Panel A of Table 2 (from Klein and Olivei, 2000), there are very few instances of on-again, 
off-again capital account controls, at least for the 10-year period that ends in 1995, the last 
                                                                                                                                                       
on inflows and restrictions on outflows.  Unfortunately, this modification of the classification 
system introduces a structural break in the measure since the two classification 
methodologies (one entry versus 13 entries) cannot easily be mapped onto each other. We do 
not discuss the expanded categorization in the post-1996 AREAER  since we know of no 
research on capital account liberalization that has used data spanning these two classification 
systems.  
5 The first work to employ such dataset—and generate a publicly available electronic 
version—was Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti 1995. Other research using such measure includes 
Rodrik 1998, and Klein and Olivei 2000.  
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year in which capital account liberalization reflects the entry in a single line of the AREAER. 
Thus, over the period 1986 to 1995, a country with a value of Share equal to 0.1 had an open 
capital account in 1995 only, a country with a value of Share equal to 0.2 had an open capital 
account in 1994 and 1995, and so on. This pattern holds for all industrial countries and for 
10 of the 12 developing countries that had some experience with open capital accounts 
during this period. Panel B of this table shows that this correspondence between the value of 
Share and the number of continuous years of open capital accounts continues to hold for 
industrial countries as the sample period is extended back to 1976. But, in this longer sample 
period, there are many more cases of on-again, off-again capital account liberalization among 
developing countries. In fact, among the developing countries that had any experience with 
open capital accounts over the period 1976–1995, the only countries where capital accounts 
were not closed after having been opened were Indonesia and Malaysia, both of which had 
open capital accounts throughout the entire 1976–1995 period.
6 
 
An Intensity Measure 
The on/off indicator of capital controls presented in the summary table of the Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions described above does not 
distinguish between strongly administered capital controls and those that are somewhat more 
porous. Quinn (1997) attempts to capture the intensity of enforcement of controls on both the 
capital account and the current account through a careful reading of the narrative descriptions 
                                                 
6 However, during the 1997/1998 Asian financial crisis Malaysia placed restrictions on its 
capital account transactions.  
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in the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (Table 1, 
Row 3).
7  
We limit our discussion to Quinn’s measures of capital account liberalization.
8 He 
scores separately the intensity of controls for capital account receipts and capital account 
payments. For each of these two categories the scoring method is as follows: a score of 0 
indicates payments are forbidden, 0.5 indicates that there are quantitative or other regulatory 
restrictions, 1 indicates that transactions are subject to heavy taxes, 1.5 indicates that there 
are less severe taxes, and 2 indicates that transactions are free of restrictions or taxes. The 
sum of the values for the two categories is an indicator of overall capital account openness 
that ranges between 0 and 4. These indicators are available annually from 1950–1997 for 21 
OECD countries, and for the years 1958, 1973, 1982, and 1988 for 43 non-OECD countries. 
A glance at Quinn’s dataset indicates that the overall trend towards liberalization is 
mostly driven by the OECD countries. Table 3 presents a tabulation of Quinn’s measure of 
capital account liberalization for 1973, 1982, and 1988, years for which these indicators are 
available for all countries. The top panel of this table presents the data for the full set of 63 
countries while the lower panel presents the data for the 42 non-OECD countries only. The 
data in the first set of columns of these tables show that, in 1973, 37 of 63 countries, 
including 26 of the 42 developing countries, had capital account indicators equal to the mid-
range (2) or lower. The overall trend towards greater capital account liberalization is 
                                                 
7 Two people separately assigned scores based on their readings of the narrative descriptions 
and then these scores were checked for discrepancies.  
8 Quinn also scores the intensity of controls for four categories related to current account 
restrictions and a category he calls international legal agreements.   
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reflected in the fact that, from 1973 to 1988, the total number of countries with capital 
account indicators equal to 2 or lower decreased to 33. But this overall trend hides significant 
heterogeneity: over the same period the number of developing countries with a score of 2 or 
lower actually increased to 32. 
As discussed in more detail below, Quinn (1997) uses the change in the value of the 
indicator of capital account restrictions rather than its level in his growth regressions 
(Table 1, row 4). The last three columns of each of the two panels in Table 3 uncover 
interesting patterns in the churning of the capital account liberalization experience. While 
most OECD countries (18 out of 21) increased their degree of liberalization between 1973 
and 1988, the developing countries were almost equally split between those that increased it 
(15 countries), reduced it (12), or kept it unchanged (15). Note also that by the end of the 
1980s, developing countries had converged towards an intermediate level of liberalization; 
developing countries that had a relatively low level of liberalization in 1973 tended toward an 
increase in this measure while the opposite held for those developing countries with a 
relatively high degree of liberalization in 1973. 
Quinn’s capital account restriction indicators are meant to be used as cardinal 
numbers and, therefore, there is the implication that a country in category 2 is literally twice 
as unfettered as one in category 1, or a change in the value of the indicator of 1 is exactly 
twice the amount of liberalization as a change in the indicator of 0.5. A less structured 
approach for using Quinn’s indicators in regressions would involve the creation of dummy 
variables representing each of the values of the indicators. Alternatively, one might decide to 
generate fewer dummy variables, say a single dummy variable that takes the value 1 when 
Quinn’s indicator takes the value 0.5, 1, or 1.5. In the extreme, one may wonder how to  
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convert Quinn’s measure into a (0,1) dummy, i.e. how to identify which value of Quinn’s 
scale would correspond to a threshold for classifying countries as open or closed. 
Table 4 suggests that the correspondence between Quinn’s multiple-measures and the 
0/1 AREAER measures is approximately achieved if one chooses a threshold of 2 in Quinn’s 
scale. Each of the six panels in this Table offers a tabulation of the number of countries that 
have capital accounts classified as 0 (closed) or 1 (open) by the AREAER and are given 
values of capital account restrictions of 0–2 (more closed) or 3–4 (more open) by Quinn. 
There are three panels for the full sample and three for developing countries, with one pair 
for each of the more recent years for which Quinn has data for all countries, 1973, 1982, and 
1988. A high correspondence between the AREAER and Quinn measures would be reflected 
in relatively large diagonal elements of the 2 x 2 matrix and relatively small off-diagonal 
elements. In fact, over 80 percent of the countries in the full sample and over 90 percent of 
the countries for the developing countries sample fall into one of the diagonal cells for each 
of the three years. For the full sample, there are few cases where the AREAER indicates open 
capital accounts while Quinn indicates closed capital accounts (that is, it is rare to find a 
relatively large number in the upper right cell of the 2 x 2 matrix). Most of the discrepancies 
between the two indicators are cases where the AREAER indicates closed capital accounts 
and Quinn gives a value of 2.5, 3, 3.5, or 4. A more detailed presentation would show that 
almost all the cases of non-zero entries in the lower-left cell represent a value of 2.5 or 3 
assigned by Quinn. Thus, there seems to be quite a high correspondence between Quinn’s 
measures and those of the AREAER, when one chooses a threshold of 2 in Quinn’s scale in 
order to classify a country’s capital account as closed or open. The relevant question is  
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whether the gradations presented by Quinn offer significant information, a point we return to 
below. 
 
Other On/Off Measures 
OECD Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements 
An alternative measure of capital account liberalization, albeit one available only for 
OECD member countries is provided in various issues of the Code of Liberalization of 
Capital Movements published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) about every other year (Table 1, row 5).
9 Each volume of the Code of 
Liberalization of Capital Movements offers data on the extent to which restrictions 
contemporaneously apply on a range of types of international transactions including direct 
investment, liquidation of direct investment, admission of securities to capital markets, 
buying and selling of securities, buying and selling of collective investment securities, 
operations in real estate, financial credits and loans, personal capital movements. The OECD 
also specifies whether the restrictions apply to commercial banks and other credit 
institutions, and to institutional investors.  
In all, the Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements reports on whether or not 
there are restrictions on eleven categories of capital account transactions. Klein and Olivei 
(2001) construct a variable that represents the proportion of these eleven categories that are 
free of restrictions, averaged over time. Thus, this variable (like the Share variable described 
                                                 
9 Between 1986 and 1985, these volumes were published in March 1986, March 1988, 
November 1990, June 1993, and 1995.    
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above) potentially ranges from 0 to 1 over the sample period but (unlike Share) its value for 
any one country in any year can take a value between 0 and 1 in increments of 
1/11. For the 
period 1986 to 1995, the four largest values for this variable are 0.89 (Germany), 0.92 
(United States), 0.921 (Netherlands) and 0.93 (United Kingdom) while two countries have 
values below one-half, Greece (0.49) and Portugal (0.43). The correlation between this 
measure and the IMF Share measure using the single annual 0/1 measures drawn from 
AREAER is 0.86. 
 
Montiel-Reinhart Intensity Measure 
Montiel and Reinhart in a series of paper develop and use an alternative measure of 
intensity of controls on international transactions based on annual information for 15 
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Egypt, 
Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Uganda) for the 
period 1990–1996.
10 This indicator ranges from 0 to 2 and, unlike the measures previously 
discussed, a higher number represents a stronger capital account restrictions.  In particular, a 
value of 0 for a particular country in a particular year represents a situation where “no 
restrictions or taxes were imposed on capital inflows and no restrictions on the domestic 
indebtedness of domestic financial institutions were in place that appeared to be in excess of 
commonly used prudential measure.”
11 A value of 1 represents restrictions that take the form 
                                                 
10 See for example, Montiel, 1996; Reinhart and Reinhart 1998; Montiel and Reinhart, 1999. 
11 All the quotes in this paragraph are from Montiel and Reinhart, 1999, notes to Table 3, 
p. 628.  
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of “overzealous prudential regulations (such as strict limits on the foreign exchange exposure 
of banks)” while a value of 2 indicates “the existence of explicit measures, such as 
prohibitions, deposit requirements, or financial transaction taxes, designed to limit capital 
flows.” (Table 1, row 6) The choice of assigning a value of 0, 1, or 2 for a particular country 
in a particular year is based upon information provided in the annual report of that country’s 
central bank. 
Each of the 15 countries in their sample begins with a value of 0 for the capital 
control proxy in 1990. Ten countries retain a value of 0 throughout the 1990–1996 period and 
five countries end the period with a value of 2. More to the point for this discussion, the only 
instance of an intermediate value of 1 is for Colombia in 1991 and 1992, after which it 
switches to 2 for 1993–1996. Thus, their effort to distinguish between the intensity of capital 
controls does not really yield many cases where “mild” capital controls are in place. In 
particular, were these data used to construct “shares” over the 1990–1996, there would be 
little difference between using the range of values 0, 1, and 2 or using only 0 and 1.
12 
 
Stock Market Liberalization Indicators 
Several papers have focused on the liberalization of controls on the international sale 
or purchase of equities. Research in this area has typically focused on dating the opening of 
equity markets to foreign investors. Levine and Zervos (1998) and Henry (2000a, 2000b), 
who extended this work, have compiled dates from a variety of sources including The Wilson 
                                                 
12 Montiel and Reinhart also provide a “sterilization index” which is scored 0, 1, or 2 and 
which has many more cases of intermediate values than does the capital control proxy.  
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Directory of Emerging Market Funds, IFC Investable Indexes, various issues of The 
Economist Intelligence Unit and the IMF’s AREAER. For instance, for each of the 11 
countries in his sample, Henry uses the dates reflecting official policy decrees as the first date 
in which a country fund is available, or a 10-percentage point jump in the IFC Investable 
Index (Table 1, row 7).
13 
Bekaert (1995) and Bekaert and Harvey (1995) also determine dates when equity 
markets in emerging economies opened to foreign investors based upon a variety of 
indicators including Official Liberalization Dates, the date of introduction of American 
Depository Receipts (ADR), the date of the introduction of country funds, and a date 
estimated through a regime-switching model based on the time series of net U.S. capital 
flows (see Table 1 in Bekaert and Harvey, 2000). The number of countries covered is 
extended in a paper by these two authors and Lundblad (2001) to 95 countries, 16 of which 
had liberalized stock markets over the full period 1980 to 1997 and 27 of which had some 
experience with stock market liberalizations over this period. (See their Appendix Table A1; 
these dates are referred to in our Table 1, row 8).  
Table 5 presents the dates of “Official International Financial Liberalization” for the 
30 countries classified as either emerging markets or frontier markets by the International 
Finance Corporation, as reported by Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001). Note that, in 
                                                 
13 For a description of his method, see the discussion on p. 533 of Henry, 2000a. Table 1 in 
this paper (p. 534) lists the dates and Table II compares these dates with those used by other 
authors. This paper is available on his web page. Henry also makes available on his web page 
a document that lists major policy events, drawn from various issues of the Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s Quarterly Economic Report, “Appendix 1: Chronological Listing of 
Major Policy Events in Developing Countries.” This includes the 11 countries included in his 
Table 1 as well as Taiwan. See 
(continued…)  
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comparing the entries in this table with the entries in Table 2, only Indonesia and Malaysia 
had both equity market liberalization and capital account liberalization (as reported by the 
IMF in the AREAER) and, equity market liberalization followed capital account liberalization 
for both of these countries. 
A recent study by Edison and Warnock (2001) provides a new measure of restrictions 
on foreign ownership of domestic equities, which shows the intensity of controls at a point in 
time as well as their evolution over time. The measure, discussed in full details in their article 
and used in cross-sectional work of Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2000), builds on the 
work of the International Finance Corporation. In particular, for emerging market countries, 
the IFC publishes two indexes of equity prices, the Global (IFCG) and Investable (IFCI) 
indexes. Since the IFCI index is comprised of IFCG stocks minus the portion not available to 
foreigners, the ratio of the market capitalizations of the IFCI to IFCG indexes is a measure of 
the availability of a country’s stocks to foreigners, and one minus the ratio is a measure of 
foreign ownership restrictions (Table 1, Row 9). This measure can be seen as an extension of 
the liberalization analysis of Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and Henry (2000a). Indeed, the 
initial relaxation of controls shown by the Edison-Warnock measure corresponds quite well 
with the Bekaert-Harvey liberalization date.
14 This new measure provides additional 
information, giving an indication of the extent of the liberalization and its evolution over 
time. It shows that international financial liberalizations can be gradual—a point also made in 
                                                                                                                                                       
 http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/henry/personal/homepage.htm.  
14 The liberalization dates in Henry (2000a) are somewhat earlier for some emerging markets, 
primarily those for which country funds existed in the mid-1980s.  
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Bekaert and Harvey (1995)—which would argue against the use of an event study approach 
or structural break analysis. 
 
B.   Quantitative Measures 
An alternative to the practice discussed above, of constructing indicators from 
published regulations, is to derive quantitative measures of the limits placed on capital 
account transactions from the values of economic variables. There are three different sets of 
variables that researchers have considered in this vein: national savings rates paired with 
national investment rates, interest rate differentials, and international capital flows. While, at 
first blush, it may seem preferable to use actual performance rather than published 
regulations in order to gauge the restrictiveness of capital controls, we will see that, as with 
rules-based measures, there are conceptual and practical challenges associated with the use of 
these quantitative measures. 
To the best of our knowledge, neither a comparison of national savings rates with 
national investment rates nor interest rate differentials has been used in studying the effects 
of capital account liberalization on long-run economic growth. There have been some recent 
efforts to use actual capital flows to estimate the effects of capital account restrictiveness on 
growth. Despite the limited use of these measures in analyzing the links between capital 
account liberalization and growth, we discuss each of these three sets of measures since they 




Feldstein and Horioka (1980) published a study that was quite influential due, in part, 
to the fact that it was one of the first efforts to quantitatively measure the extent of capital 
mobility across a broad range of countries. They analyzed the behavior of savings and 
investment in a number of countries to measure the “true” degree of capital mobility, arguing 
that the degree of correlation between the two series was a good indicator of impediments to 
capital movements. In any particular year, savings matches investment in a country with 
stringent capital account restrictions while there need not be a link between savings and 
investment in a country with free capital mobility. Feldstein and Horioka found that, over the 
period 1960–1974, as well as over the three five-year sub-periods making up this 15-year 
period, average savings rates and average investment rates were highly positively correlated. 
Based on this finding, they concluded that there were significant impediments to capital 
movements.
15  
But this conclusion has been criticized since the savings and investment rates of a 
country may be highly correlated, even if that country has no restrictions on international 
capital flows. For example, Obstfeld (1986) shows that, even with perfect capital mobility, 
savings and investment may be highly correlated just because of the types of shocks hitting 
an economy. Obstfeld also demonstrated that the savings–investment correlations were 
higher for large countries than for small countries, a result one would expect to find if there 
was free capital mobility and outcomes in large countries influenced worldwide economic 
conditions. Furthermore, Obstfeld documents a reduction in savings-investment correlations 
                                                 
15 Montiel (1996) used the Feldstein-Horioka method to assess capital mobility by using 
results of the industrial countries as a benchmark to assess the degree of capital mobility for 
emerging markets.  
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in the post-1973 period. A different criticism of Feldstein and Horioka’s conclusions 
concerning the extent of capital mobility based on savings–investment correlations comes 
from Bayoumi (1990) who shows that this correlation may just reflect efforts by 
governments to target the current account.  
Another set of quantitative measures of capital mobility includes onshore-offshore 
interest rate differentials and deviations from covered interest rate parity. Unlike stock 
market returns or other quantitative measures, short-term interest rates can be analyzed 
without first transforming them in model-specific ways. However, data availability restricts 
this method to a limited number of countries.  
Recently, efforts have been made to gauge the extent of capital mobility through the 
use of actual capital inflows and outflows, either as a percentage of GDP (Kraay 1998) or, as 
in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (forthcoming), by using an annual measure of portfolio and direct 
investment assets and liabilities as a percent of GDP as a long-run indicator of financial 
openness (see IMF, 2001, Chanda, 2001, and O’Donnell, 2001). These measures are 
analogous to measures of trade openness, and can be thought of in a similar manner. For 
example, like the level of trade openness, which is typically calculated as the sum of imports 
and exports over GDP, the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti measure is a good indicator of openness 
at a point in time. But both the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti measure, and that of Kraay, may 
fluctuate from year-to-year since capital flows are endogenous and there can be large 
valuation adjustments due to, say, a large swing in equity values (Eichengreen 2001). 
However, changes in these measures over longer periods are likely to be indicative of 
changes in openness. In the subsequent section, this stock measure will be referred to as the 
openness measure.  
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C.   Comparisons of Rules-Based and Quantitative Measures of Capital Account 
Liberalization
16 
We would hope to find that a measure of capital account restrictiveness based on 
published regulations and rules is correlated with one that reflects the actual behavior of 
capital flows. Figure 1 offers some evidence that enables us to judge the correspondence 
between these two types of measures. This figure includes the time series of a rule-based 
measure, related to the restrictions on capital flows as reported to the IMF by national 
authorities, as well as a measure of capital account openness based on the estimated stocks of 
gross foreign assets and liabilities as a ratio of GDP. 
Figure 1 shows that both the rules-based and the quantitative measures indicate that 
capital accounts in industrial countries have become considerably less restricted over time. A 
particularly rapid decline in controls occurred during the 1980s, when the members of the 
European Community (now called the European Union) liberalized capital controls. 
Following this, there was a dramatic rise in cross-border capital flows. Among industrial 
countries, Canada, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom appear to have the 
most unfettered international capital flows, based on the estimated stocks of gross foreign 
assets and liabilities as a percent of national income. 
In developing countries, the story is more complex. In general, both measures suggest 
a less dramatic shift toward liberalization and openness than in industrial countries. For the 
developing countries as a whole, the rules-based restriction measure suggests that, after a 
period of liberalization in the 1970s, the trend toward openness reversed in the 1980s. 
                                                 
16 Parts of this section are adapted from the World Economic Outlook, October 2001.  
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Liberalization resumed in the early 1990s, but the pace has been relatively slow; the rules-
based measure indicates that the current level of the indicator on average is only at the same 
level as it was in the late 1970s. By comparison, the capital account openness measure based 
on the estimated stocks of gross foreign assets and liabilities as a ratio of GDP shows a 
modest decline in openness to capital flows during the early 1970s, followed by a moderate 
increase in the 1980s, which accelerated sharply in the early 1990s.  
 
D.   Efficacy of Capital Account Controls 
Some of the rules-based indicators discussed above attempt to distinguish between 
the intensity with which capital account restrictions are imposed. But rules-based measures 
focus on de jure restrictions rather than the de facto efficacy of controls. Obviously, it is 
easier to determine whether laws controlling capital flows are on the books than whether 
these laws are enforced or, if they are enforced, whether they effectively stem the flow of 
capital that would otherwise be moving into or out of a country.  
Various episodes suggest that capital controls have, at best, a temporary effect on 
stemming capital inflows or outflows. For example, Spain attempted to use capital controls to 
shield itself from the disruptions in the European Monetary System in September 1992 but 
the peseta was devalued in November anyway. Capital controls on inflows in Colombia 
(1993–1998) and Brazil (1993–1997) did not prevent the continued appreciation of their 
currencies. In Brazil, the presence of sophisticated financial institutions enabled people to get 
around controls. Likewise, the much-heralded controls on capital inflows to Chile, which 
took the form of unremunerated reserve requirements (URR), lost their effectiveness as 
people found loopholes that enabled them to avoid these regulations. Capital controls in  
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Thailand and Malaysia may have altered the maturity structure of capital inflows, though 
capital controls did not insulate the Thai baht from the consequences of speculative pressures 
in 1997.
17  
If, in fact, capital controls are generally ridden with holes and are not efficacious, 
then we would not expect to find a strong link between capital account liberalization and any 
measures of economic performance, all else equal. We next turn to a review of empirical 
analyses of whether or not capital account liberalization is significantly associated with 
economic growth.  
 
II.   REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION AND GROWTH  
Economic theory suggests a number of benefits that may accompany capital account 
liberalization. Open capital accounts can foster a more efficient allocation of resources, 
provide opportunities for risk diversification and help promote financial development. But 
there is also a good deal of skepticism concerning the benefits of capital mobility.  
While analysis of the costs of capital account liberalization have been limited, there is 
a large and growing literature that tests the potential benefits of capital account liberalization 
through its influence on long-run growth and development, by directly investigating the 
empirical relationship between capital account liberalization and economic growth. Almost 
                                                 
17Efforts to quantify the effects of capital controls include Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989) 
who looked at EMS members in the 1980s, and Edwards (1999) and De Gregorio, Edwards, 
and Valdes (2000) who considered the effects of Chile’s unremunerated reserve 
requirements. More recently Edison and Reinhart (2001) and Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) have 
examined the effectiveness of Malaysian capital controls, which were applied during the 
Asian financial crisis.  
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all of these studies augment a basic growth model that includes variables such as the level of 
schooling, investment, population growth, and the level of GDP in the initial year with a 
measure of capital account liberalization. 
Table 6 presents an overview of these studies of the effects of capital account 
liberalization on growth. Each row of this table presents information on one study.  The 
columns of the table offer information on the country coverage, the indicator of 
liberalization, the estimation techniques and the general result of the studies.  
The information presented in Table 6 indicates that there is a wide divergence in 
results across studies. This may reflect a number of differences in these studies. First, the 
country coverage is different across studies, with some authors analyzing industrial countries, 
others developing countries, and others a mixture of the two. Second, there are differences in 
the sample period, which may be particularly important for developing countries given the 
recent nature of many capital account liberalizations. Third, the applied methodology (cross-
sectional, time series, or panel) and the estimation technique (ordinary least squares, 
instrumental variables, or generalized method of moments) differ across studies.  
In addition to particular differences across studies, there are some general drawbacks 
with the literature that analyzes the relationship between liberalization and growth. As noted 
in the previous section, rules-based measures of capital account controls and liberalization 
used in the bulk of these studies are relatively crude. However, it should be noted that the 
previous section has also shown that various measures offer a broadly consistent picture of 
the time series and cross sectional behavior of capital account liberalization. On a more 
conceptual note, while capital account liberalization is often treated as exogenous to the 
growth process, in practice countries with particular growth experiences or at particular  
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levels of development may be more prone to liberalize their capital accounts, implying the 
potential for reverse causality.
18 But the authors of many of these studies recognize this 
potential shortcoming and attempt to address it through the use of instrumental variable 
estimation. 
We next survey these studies in more detail, beginning with work that offers support 
for the hypothesis that capital account liberalization promotes economic growth, and then 
turning to studies that cast some doubt on this relationship. 
 
A.   Supporting Evidence of Capital Account Liberalization on Growth 
Quinn (1997) is one of the first studies to identify a positive result between capital 
account liberalization and growth. Quinn augments the set of variables included in a standard 
growth regression with either a variable representing his indicator of the change in financial 
openness (described above) or the change in a broader measure of openness.
19 The change in 
the financial openness variable and the change in the broader openness variable are 
calculated by subtracting the 1958 value of the index from its 1988 value. Quinn’s empirical 
estimates suggest that the change in capital account liberalization has a strongly significant 
effect on the growth in real GDP per capita in his cross section of 58 countries over the 
period 1960 to 1989. It is hard to disentangle the separate effects of financial openness and a 
                                                 
18 For example, a country with weak economic performance might choose to adopt capital 
controls and there is a danger in such a case to interpret incorrectly that the country’s low 
growth depends on those controls. 
19 The base regression includes also initial GDP per capita, investment as a share of GDP, 
population growth and secondary-school enrollment rates.    
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broader measure of openness in Quinn’s results because he does not include a regression with 
both of these indicators and, therefore, to the extent that the change in financial openness is 
correlated with the change in the openness of trade in goods and services, the finding of a 
significant effect of the change in capital account liberalization on growth may reflect the 
correlation of changes in restrictions on the capital account and the current account.  
Klein and Olivei (2000) find a positive effect of capital account liberalization on 
growth among industrial countries, but they do not find evidence that capital account 
liberalization promotes growth in non-industrial countries. This study follows a slightly 
different strategy from other research in this area by first focusing on the role of capital 
account liberalization on financial development and then considering the effect of financial 
development on growth. Klein and Olivei regress the capital account liberalization indicator 
Share described above (along with other standard regressors) on the change in financial 
depth over the period 1986 to 1995. They find a significant effect of capital account 
liberalization on the change in financial depth in the cross section of 82 developed and 
developing nations. This significant result seems to be due to the presence of the OECD 
countries in the sample. Klein and Olivei show that capital account liberalization 
significantly affects the change in financial depth in a sample consisting of the 20 OECD 
countries, but not in a sample of the non-OECD countries, nor in a narrower non-OECD 
sample of 18 Latin American countries, a group that had a relatively high incidence of capital 
account liberalizations. They also estimate a growth model that includes the change in 
financial depth as regressor and find that financial development is significant determinant of 
growth per capita. Klein and Olivei conclude that the beneficial effects of capital account 
liberalization, at least with respect to promoting financial depth, are achieved only in an  
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environment in which there is a constellation of other institutions that can usefully support 
the changes brought about by the free flow of capital. Bailliu (2000) also finds that capital 
account liberalization spurs growth by promoting financial development. 
This conjecture, that the growth effects of capital account liberalization depend upon 
the level of development of an economy, is supported by the results presented in Edwards 
(2001). Edwards finds that both the Quinn level and the ∆Quinn variables are significantly 
associated with growth in per capita income in the 1980s for a sample of about 60 countries, 
though his results are not robust when he instead uses Share. Edwards estimates regressions 
using weighted least squares, with the weights representing national income in 1985. He 
includes both the capital account liberalization variables and an interactive term representing 
the product of the variables and the logarithm of income per capita in 1980. His estimates 
show a negative coefficient on capital account openness and a positive coefficient on the 
openness-income interactive term. This suggests that capital account openness detracts from 
growth for countries at lower levels of income but promotes growth in industrial countries 
and in the richer emerging market countries. 
Edwards’ methodology is scrutinized in Arteta, Eichengreen, and Wyplosz (2001). 
They question why Edwards obtains such strong results while other studies (cited below) fail 
to find any significant effect of capital account liberalization on growth. They point to a 
number of potential reasons for this discrepancy. They question whether Quinn’s measures, 
representing capital account openness in 1973 and 1988 only, is appropriate for the period 
Edwards studies. They also note that weighting observations by 1985 per capita GDP means 
that rich countries have much more influence in the regressions than do poor countries. There 
are also questions raised concerning the exogeneity of instruments used for capital account  
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liberalization and the exclusion of other potentially relevant measures of openness, such as 
the openness of the current account, which may be correlated with capital account openness. 
Estimates by Arteta, Eichengreen, and Wyplosz suggest that Edwards’ results may be 
sensitive to a variety of factors and, therefore, they conclude that there is little evidence that 
capital account liberalization has more favorable effects in high-income and middle-income 
countries than in poorer developing countries.  
But Arteta, Eichengreen, and Wyplosz do find some support for differences in the 
effect of capital account liberalization across countries, depending upon the degree of 
macroeconomic stability. They introduce two capital account interaction terms, multiplying 
the Quinn openness measure by both the Sachs-Warner (1995) openness measure and the 
black-market premium. They find that the interaction term representing the product of capital 
account openness and the black market premium is significant but the other interaction term, 
representing the product of the Sachs-Warner openness measure and capital account 
openness, is not significant. They interpret this to mean that countries that open their capital 
accounts grow faster, but only if they first eliminate the black market premium. 
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001) (henceforth BHL) examine the impact of stock 
market liberalization on economic growth. As previous researchers have done, they begin 
their analysis by augmenting the standard set of growth model variables with their variable 
indicating stock market liberalization. To maximize the time-series content in their 
regression, they use a moving average panel data method. This means that they create 
overlapping data and therefore have to deal with the resulting moving average error 
component by adjusting their standard errors. In general, BHL find that financial 
liberalization leads to a 1 percent increase in annual per capital GDP growth over a five-year  
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period and that this effect is statistically significant. BHL investigate the robustness of this 
result with respect to alternative sets of liberalization dates, different country groupings, and 
different time horizons for measuring economic growth. These results, along with those of 
Quinn, appear to be the strongest evidence supporting the hypothesis that capital account 
liberalization promotes growth among developing countries. 
Following a slightly different tact, O’Donnell (2001) examines the impact of capital 
account liberalization using both IMF rules-based measure and a quantitative based measure 
of financial openness. Using a rather standard setup, he finds that the rules-based measure 
tends to be too coarse an indicator of the degree of capital account liberalization as it does 
not take account the nature of different types of controls. However, using the quantitative 
measure, he finds that capital account liberalization does seem to speed up economic growth. 
However, like other researchers he finds that the benefits to all countries are not equal. This 
difference in impact was also echoed in Chanda (2001). He suggests that the impact may 
vary with the level of ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity in the society, a proxy for the 
number of interest groups.  In particular, he finds that capital controls lead to greater 
inefficiencies and lower growth among countries with a high degree of ethnic and linguistic 
heterogeneity.  
 
B.   Studies Not Supporting the Hypothesis that Liberalization Promotes Growth 
  Several studies have found no correlation between openness and growth. In fact, one 
of the first efforts to determine whether capital account liberalization promotes growth using 
a cross-section of countries was Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995), although this was not the 
main focus of their paper. This study considers average growth of per capita income for five  
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nonoverlapping five-year periods between 1966 and 1989. Their sample includes 61 
countries although, with 181 observations in one set of regressions and 238 in another, not 
every country appears in each of the five sub-periods. They regress five-year growth rates on 
Share and comparable measures that capture the presence of current account controls 
(CurrAcct) and a multiple exchange rate system (MultEx) from Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions. In addition they include variables such as initial income, political 
variables and the level of schooling. The three variables Share, CurrAcct, and MultEx enter 
as predicted values from instrumental variable regressions using lagged values as the 
instruments. Their results do not support the hypothesis that capital account liberalization 
promotes growth. In some cases, capital account controls enter with a positive sign (that is, 
Share enters negatively) while the indicator of current account controls sometime enters with 
a negative sign (CurrAcct is positive).
20 
Rodrik (1998), in a widely cited paper, also casts doubt on the effect of capital 
account liberalization on growth. In a sample that includes almost 100 countries, developing 
as well as developed, he finds no significant effect of capital account liberalization, as 
measured by Share, on the percentage change in real income per capita over the period 1975 
to 1989 in growth regressions that also include initial per capita income, initial secondary-
school enrollment rate, an index of the quality of governmental institutions and regional 
dummy variables. Likewise, he finds no relationship between capital account liberalization 
and investment-to-income, nor between capital account liberalization and inflation. 
Eichengreen (2001) offers several possible reasons for the differences in the results between 
                                                 
20 See their Table 4, p. 537.  
 28
the Quinn and Rodrik papers, including the fact that Quinn’s sample includes fewer 
developing countries than Rodrik, the smaller proportion of years in Quinn’s study 
representing the “lost decade” of the 1980s and differences in the capital account indicator. 
The regressions presented in the next section allow us to explore the role of these potential 
sources of the differences in the two studies.  
Kraay (1998) also finds no significant relationship, using a variety of measures of 
capital account openness, including Share, Quinn’s capital account openness indicator (in 
levels, with values from 0 to 4), and a measure based on actual net capital flows. Each of 
these measures is associated with a different sample size. His regressions take the form of 
cross sections, with one observation per country, where the dependent variable is the growth 
in output between 1985 and 1997. He uses both OLS and an approach in which the capital 
account liberalization variables are instrumented by their own past values. He fails to find a 
significant effect of Share or the Quinn indicator on growth, but, when these indicators are 
interacted with the average balance of the financial account (from the balance of payments 
statistics), he does find some significant effects.  
 
 
III.   EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
The literature reviewed in the previous section offers a diverse set of results 
concerning the effect of capital account liberalization on growth.  In this section, in an effort 
to reconcile some of the differences in the literature, we estimate the effects of a variety of 
measures of capital account liberalization on economic growth.  We present estimates of  
 29
growth regressions that augment a standard economic growth model
21 with different 
indicators of capital account openness or stock market liberalization, but otherwise use a 
common set of regressors, a common regressand, and draw observations from the same time 
period.
22  For comparability, we use a single dataset, the Klein and Olivei (2000).    
 
A. The Basic Growth Model and the Impact of Capital Account Liberalizaton 
The regressand in all of the estimates presented in this section is the growth in real 
per capita income over the period 1976 to 1995 (∆lnY76 – 95).  The control variables used in 
the growth model include the logarithm of real per capita income in 1976 (ln (Y1976)), the 
logarithm of secondary school enrollment rate in 1976 (ln(Educ.)), the average investment to 
GDP ratio for the years 1974 to 1978 (Invest.74 – 78), the population growth rate from 1976 to 
1995 (∆Pop.76 – 95) and a dummy variable for countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Africa).  
Column 1 of Table 7 shows the results of a growth regression using these regressors for a 
sample of 89 countries.  Each of the coefficients in the regression are significant at the 95 
percent level of confidence or better, but for the coefficient on the average investment to 
GDP ratio.  
We use three different indicators of capital account liberalization.  First, as discussed 
in Section II, Share76 – 95 represents the proportion of years in the period 1976 to 1995 that a 
country had open capital accounts, based on information from line E.2 of the IMF’s Annual 
                                                 
21 See for example Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) and Levine and Renelt (1992). 
22 There remain, however, differences in the samples across regressions due to differences in 
the set of countries covered by each indicator of capital market openness.  Below we discuss 
the sensitivity of results to the use of different samples of countries.   
 30
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. Second, we use the 0 to 4 
measure of capital account openness in 1982 from Quinn (1997), which we denote as 
Quinn82.  As discussed above, Quinn used the change in the value of his indicator and, 
therefore, we also present a regression in which we use the difference in the value of the 0 to 
4 measure of capital account openness between 1973 and 1988, ∆Quinn73 – 88.
23  Third, we 
use the dates of stock market liberalization from Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2001) to 
calculate the proportion of years between 1980 (when the data are first available) and 1995 
that a country had a liberalized stock market.  This variable, BHL80–95, is therefore analogous 
in its construction to Share76-95. 
Columns 2 through 5 of Table 7 present growth regressions in which the standard 
growth model presented in Column 1 is augmented with, in turn, each of these indicators of 
capital account liberalization.  The results in this column generally support the hypothesis 
that liberalization of the capital account or of the equity market promotes growth, ceteris 
paribus. The coefficients on Share76 – 95, Quinn82, and BHL80 – 95 each have a p-value of less 
than 0.01.  The coefficient on ∆Quinn73 – 88 is positive but insignificant (the p-value is 0.50), a 
result at odds with those presented in Quinn (1997) in which the estimated coefficient on the 
change in the capital account openness measure is positive and significant.
24 
                                                 
23 Recall that Quinn’s measure of capital account openness is available only for the years 
1973, 1982 and 1988 for non-OECD countries. 
24In a regression that differs from the one presented in Column 3 only by the use of the Quinn 
indicator of capital account openness in 1973 rather than its value in 1982, the coefficient on 
the Quinn 0 – 4 indicator of capital account openness has a value of 0.09 with an associated 
p-value of 0.08.   We have also run regressions similar to the one presented in Column 4 but 
with the difference in the Quinn indicator of capital account openness between 1982 and 
(continued…)  
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  A question that arises when considering the results in Columns 2 through 5 of Table 
7 is whether there is an upward bias on the coefficients on liberalization because of reverse 
causality; perhaps the countries that are most likely to have liberalized their capital accounts 
are the ones that grew most quickly during the relevant period.  To address this question, we 
present, in Columns 6 through 8 of Table 7, two-stage regressions that instrument for the 
values of the liberalization measures.  The instruments that we use include government 
consumption as proportion of GDP in 1976, imports as proportion of GDP in 1976, a dummy 
variable for Latin American countries and another dummy variable for East Asian countries.  
In addition, for Share76 – 95 and for BHL 80– 95 we use, as an instrument, the 0 or 1 value of the 
capital account openness measure for 1973 from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions while for the Quinn 0 to 4 measure of capital 
account openness in 1982 we use, as an instrument, the 1973 value of Quinn’s openness 
measure.  
The results presented in Columns 6 through 8 of Table 7 indicate that, in all three 
cases, there is not an upward bias on the liberalization measures coefficients when we use 
OLS estimation since, in each case, the coefficient is larger using instrumental variables than 
when using OLS.   Each of the liberalization coefficients presented in Columns 6 through 8 is 
significant at the 99 percent level of confidence or better.  The adjusted R
2 for the first stage 
regression (which is not reported in the table) is 0.61 for Share76 – 95, 0.69 for Quinn82, and 
0.59 for BHL80 – 95.   
                                                                                                                                                       
1988, as well as between 1973 and 1982.  The coefficients on the change in the capital 
account indicator in these regressions are not significant at standard levels.   
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The results of a formal test concerning the possible endogeneity of the capital account 
openness variables are presented in Table 7 in the row labeled “DM p-value.”  The statistics 
in this row are obtained using the artificial regression technique discussed in Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1989).
25 As shown in this row, the p-values on the coefficients on the 
instrumented regressors are 0.13 in the regression using Share76 – 95, 0.52 in the regression 
using Quinn82, and 0.01 in the regression using BHL80 – 95.  Therefore, estimates using OLS 
are not plagued by a significant (at the 10 percent level) problem with respect to consistency 
because of the endogeneity of the capital account openness variables in the regressions using 
either Share76 – 95, or Quinn82.  There is evidence, however, that supports the use of 
instrumental variables in the regression using BHL80 – 95.  In the remainder of this section, we 
present results of the Davidson and MacKinnon test for all regressions and, where 





                                                 
25 The “artificial regression” is one in which the OLS regression is augmented with the 
instrumented values of the potentially endogenous variable.  Under the null hypothesis that 
the OLS estimates of the coefficients of the regression are consistent (and assuming that the 
instrumental variable estimates are consistent), the coefficient on the instrumented regressor 
is asymptotically equal to zero.  Therefore, if the coefficient on the instrumented variable in 
the augmented artificial regression is insignificant, we cannot reject the hypothesis that OLS 
provides us with consistent estimators. We employ this test and report the p-value of the 
coefficient on the instrumented regressor in the row labeled “DM p-value” in Table 7. 
26 In the regressions reported in Tables 8 and 9 there are several capital account openness 
variables in each regression since we allow for different coefficients across regions.  In these 
cases, the DM test is an F-test of the joint significance of all the capital account openness 
variables used in the regression.    
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B. The Robustness of the Results 
An issue that arises in the literature surveyed above is whether the effect of capital 
account liberalization differs between industrial counties and developing countries.  We 
investigate this in Columns 1 through 3 of Table 8 by reporting separate slope coefficients 
for industrial and developing countries (countries are classified as industrial if they were 
members of the O.E.C.D. in 1986).
27  These results show that the estimated effect on 
economic growth of capital account openness or stock market liberalization is larger in 
developing countries than in industrial countries.
28 For developing countries, coefficients on 
both measures of capital account openness, Share76 – 95, and Quinn82, are significant at better 
than the 99 percent level.  In addition, the coefficient on Quinn82 for industrial countries is 
also significant at better than the 99 percent level. The results for stock market liberalization, 
estimated using instrumental variables, also indicate strongly significant effects for both 
developing countries and industrial countries.   
All three regressions reported in Columns 1 through 3 of Table 8 show a significant 
effect of capital account liberalization on growth among non–O.E.C.D. countries but differ in 
the reported effect among O.E.C.D. countries. One possible source of this difference is the 
                                                 
27 These results are obtained by including in the regressions both the measures of 
liberalization and the product of the respective measure and a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 for the 20 countries in the sample that were members of the O.E.C.D. in 1986.  
These countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
28 There is a statistically significant difference (at the 92 percent level) between the estimated 
coefficients for developing and industrial countries for BHL80 – 95, but not at the 90 percent 
level for Share76 – 95, nor for Quinn82.    
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samples used in each regression. We ran regressions using Share76 – 95, allowing for different 
effects across industrial and developing countries, using the subsamples employed when 
using either Quinn82 or BHL80 – 95 as a regressor. The Quinn82 sample of 52 countries yields 
estimates of the effect of capital account liberalization on growth of 0.17 for industrial 
countries and 0.34 for developing countries, with associated p-values of 0.20 and 0.06, 
respectively.  These point estimates are both a bit smaller and somewhat less significant than 
those obtained with the full sample of 89 countries.  With the sample of 82 countries used in 
the estimation of the effects of BHL80 – 95 on growth, the estimated effect of Share76 – 95 on 
growth for industrial countries is 0.20 (with a p-value of 0.07) and for developing countries it 
is 0.32 (with a p-value of 0.07).  This suggests that differences across indicators due to 
differences in samples necessitated by data availability are not pronounced. 
The discussion in Section II shows that the majority of cases of capital account 
liberalization and stock market liberalization outside of the OECD occurred among countries 
in Latin America and East Asia.  Columns 4 through 6 of Table 8 continue our investigation 
of differential effects of liberalization across sets of countries by allowing for separate slopes 
across countries in Latin America, countries in East Asia, OECD member countries, and all 
other countries.  These estimates suggest that the largest and most significant effect of capital 
account liberalization on growth occurred among East Asian countries.  For each of the three 
variables, the effect of liberalization on growth in East Asia is significant at greater than the 
99 percent level of confidence.  In other regions, there is less evidence of a significant effect 
of capital account liberalization on growth.  This effect is significant for the OECD countries 
in this set of regressions only when using the Quinn82 indicator of capital account openness.   
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Capital account liberalization is estimated to have a negative effect on growth among Latin 
American countries when using the Share76 – 95 indicator.  
Differences in the effect of capital account liberalization on growth across the set of 
industrial and developing countries are present in some of the research discussed in the 
literature review above.  But, in those papers, (such as Klein and Olivei (2000) and Edwards 
(2001)), capital account liberalization is usually found to have a more significant effect in 
promoting growth in industrial countries.  The results of this paper, however, suggest that 
open capital accounts and liberalized stock markets have a significant effect on growth 
among East Asian countries, but there is less consistent evidence of these effects elsewhere, 
even among industrial countries.   
One concern with the results presented in Tables 7 and 8 is that it is possible that 
capital account liberalization is really just a proxy for some other characteristic of the 
countries in the sample.  Rodrik (1998) argues that capital account liberalization measures 
serve as a proxy for the quality of government.  We investigate this possibility in Table 9.  
This specifications used in the regressions reported in this table differ from those used in 
Table 8 only by the inclusion of a measure of government reputation.  This measure, from 
Knack and Keefer (1995), draws on information from various volumes of the International 
Country Risk Guide. The variable potentially ranges from 1 to 10, with larger values 
indicating that a government is less likely to repudiate contracts.  For most countries, the 
variable reflects reputation in 1982. 
The results in Table 9 support the importance of government reputation as a 
determinant of growth but do not support the claim that capital account liberalization merely 
serves as a proxy for government reputation.  In each of the six regressions, the coefficient on  
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government reputation is significant at better than the 99 percent level of confidence. While 
it is true that the neither the coefficient on Quinn82 for industrial nor for developing countries 
is significant in Column 2 (in contrast to the results presented in Table 8), and that the 
coefficient on Share76 – 95 for developing countries has a p-value of 0.07 as compared to 0.01 
when government reputation is not included as a regressor (Column 1 in each table), the 
coefficient on BHL80 – 95 for developing countries reported in Column 3 as well as each of the 
coefficients on the capital account openness or stock market liberalization variables for East 
Asia in Columns 4 through 6 continue to be significant at better than the 99 percent level of 
confidence.   
A careful comparison of Tables 8 and 9 shows that the introduction of the 
government reputation variable reduces the number of observations in the regressions using 
Share86 – 95 by about one-fifth, from 89 to 71.  This is part of the reason for the differences in 
the results concerning the coefficients on capital account liberalization in Columns 1 and 4 
across these two tables.  A regression with a specification like that in Column 1 of Table 8 
that uses the sample of 71 countries that have non-missing values of the government 
repudiation variable (i.e. the sample used in Columns 1 and 4 of Table 9) has estimated 
coefficients of 0.17 (with a p-value of 0.09) for industrial countries and 0.34 (with a p-value 
of 0.06) for developing countries.  These point estimates are lower than those reported in 
Column 1 of Table 8 and these coefficients are less significant in the more restricted sample.  
When allowing for different estimates across regions of non–O.E.C.D. countries, the main 
difference in the value and pattern of significance between the samples of 71 and 89 
countries is that the former yields a significant effect of capital account liberalization on 
growth for non–O.E.C.D. countries outside of Latin America and East Asia; the estimated  
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coefficient on Share86 – 95 for this group of countries is 1.13, with a standard error of 0.47 
(and therefore a p-value of 0.02).  The pattern of significance of the effects of stock market 
liberalization on growth presented in Column 6 of Table 8 do not change very much if we 
restrict the sample to the 68 countries that have non-missing observations for both the 
government reputation variable and BHL80 – 95. Therefore, the loss of significance of the 
coefficient on BHL80 – 95 for non-O.E.C.D. countries outside of East Asia and Latin America 
is likely due to the correlation of government reputation with BHL80 – 95 for these countries.  
But note that the coefficient on the BHL80 – 95 for East Asian countries retains its significance 
in the results presented in Column 6 of Table 9. 
 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
The consequences and desirability of capital account liberalization among developing 
countries is likely to remain a topic of debate for the foreseeable future.  People on one side 
of this debate will maintain those countries that open up to financial flows will set the stage 
for more rapid development. Those on the other side will question the advantages actually 
conferred by capital account liberalization and, furthermore, will argue that countries become 
more vulnerable to financial disruptions not of their own making when their governments 
relinquish control over the inflow and outflow of capital. 
In this paper we have surveyed what current research is able to tell us about the 
consequences of capital account liberalization.  We point out that, while industrial countries 
have largely liberalized their capital accounts, and there has been some movement towards 
more widespread capital account liberalization among developing countries, the majority of 
developing countries retain controls over capital flows.  The evidence on the effects of this  
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are somewhat mixed.  We have shown that empirical evidence presented in existing research 
does not strongly point towards a general result concerning the consequences of capital 
account liberalization.  There is mixed evidence that capital account liberalization promotes 
long-run economic growth.  Our own regression results suggest that these effects are most 
pronounced among countries in East Asia.  Other research surveyed in this paper, however, 
suggests a more pronounced effect of capital account liberalization among industrial 
countries than among a more broadly defined set of developing countries. 
Given the importance of this topic, the lack of a clear consensus in the literature, and, 
perhaps most importantly, the fact that undertaking capital account liberalization is more 
easily achieved than many other policies advocated to governments of developing countries, 
it is very likely literature on the topic surveyed in this paper will continue to expand.  The 
concern that this research is hampered by a strong set of variables reflecting capital account 
openness should be somewhat allayed by the statistics presented in this paper showing a 
common cross-country picture of capital account openness regardless of the (admittedly 
imperfect) indicators that are employed.  But, as better indicators are developed, and as we 
obtain a longer time series that encompasses a wider range of experiences, we would expect 





Ahearne, Alan, William Griever, and Francis Warnock, 2000, “Information Costs and Home 
Bias: An Analysis of U.S. Holdings of Foreign Equities,” International Finance 
Discussion Paper 691, (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System). 
 
Arteta, Carlos, Barry Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz, 2001, “On the Growth Effects of 
Capital Account Liberalization,” (unpublished; Berkeley, California: University of 
California).  
 
Bailliu, Jeannine, 2000, “Private Capital Flows, Financial Development, and Economic 
Growth in Developing Countries,” Bank of Canada Working Paper No. 2000-15, 
(Ontario, Canada, Bank of Canada). 
 
Barro, Robert, and Xavier Sala-i, Martin, 1995, “Economic Growths,” (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press). 
 
Bayoumi, Tamim, 1990, “Saving-Investment Correlations,” IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 37, No. 2 
(June), pp. 360–86. 
 
Bekaert, Geert, 1995, “Market Integration and Investment Barriers in Emerging Equity 
Markets,” World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 9, pp. 75–107. 
 
———, and Campbell Harvey, 1995, “Time-Varying World Market Integration,” Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 50, pp. 403–44. 
 
———, and Campbell Harvey, 2000, “Foreign Speculators and Emerging Equity Markets,” 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 55 (April), pp. 565–613. 
 
———, and Robin Lumsdaine, “Dating the Integration of World Equity Markets,” 
forthcoming, Journal of Financial Economics. 
 
Bekaert, Geert, Campbell Harvey, and Christian Lundblad, 2001, “Does Financial 
Liberalization Spur Growth?” NBER Working Paper No. 8245 (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research). 
 
Bhagwati, Jagdish, 1998, “The Capital Myth: The Difference Between Trade in Widgets and 
Trade in Dollars,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, pp. 7–12. 
  
Chanda, Areendam, 2001, “The Influence of Capital Controls on Long-Run Growth: Where 
and How Much?” (unpublished; Providence, Rhode Island: Brown University). 
  
 40
Davidson, Russell and James G. MacKinnon, “Testing for Consistency Using Artificial 
Regressions,” Econometric Theory, vol. 5, pp. 363 – 384. 
DeGregorio, José, Sebastian Edwards, and Rodrigo O. Valdes, 2000, “Controls on Capital 
Inflows: Do They Work?” NBER Working Paper No. 7645 (April) (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research). 
 
Edison, Hali J., and Carmen Reinhart, 2001, “Stopping Hot Money,” Journal of Development 
Economics, Vol. 66, pp 533–53. 
 
Edison, Hali J., and Francis E. Warnock, 2001, “A Simple Measure of the Intensity of 
Capital Controls,” IMF Working Paper 01/180 (Washington: International Monetary 
Fund). 
  
Edwards, Sebastian, 1999, “How Effective are Capital Controls?” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Fall, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 65–84. 
 
———, 2001, “Capital Mobility and Economic Performance: Are Emerging Economies 
Different?” NBER Working Paper No. 8076 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National 
Bureau of Economic Research). 
 
Eichengreen, Barry, 2001, “Capital Account Liberalization: What Do Cross-Country Studies 
Tell Us?'” (unpublished; Berkeley, California: University of California. 
  
Feldstein, Martin, and Charles Horioka, 1980, “Domestic Saving and International Capital 
Flows,” The Economic Journal, Vol. 90, No. 358, pp. 314–29. 
 
Giavazzi, Francesco, and Alberto Giovannini, 1989, Limiting Exchange Rate Flexibility: The 
European Monetary System, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press). 
 
Grilli, Vittorio, and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, 1995, “Economic Effects and Structural 
Determinants of Capital Controls,” IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 517–51. 
  
Henry, Peter Blair, 2000a, “Stock Market Liberalization, Economic Reform, and Emerging 
Market Equity Prices,” Journal of Finance, Vol. LV, No. 2 (April), pp. 529–64. 
 
———, 2000b, “Do Stock Market Liberalizations Cause Investment Booms?” Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 58, Nos. 1-2 (October), pp. 301–34. 
 
International Monetary Fund, 2001,. World Economic Outlook, October (Washington: 
International Monetary Fund). 
 
———, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, Various 
Issues, (Washington: International Monetary Fund).  
  
 41
Kaplan, Ethan, and Dani Rodrik, 2001, “Did the Malaysian Capital Controls Work?” NBER 
Working Paper No. 8142 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic 
Research). 
 
Klein, Michael W., and Giovanni Olivei, 2000, “Capital Account Liberalization, Financial 
Depth and Economic Growth,” unpublished; (Boston, Massachusetts: Fletcher School 
of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University). 
 
Knack, Stephen, and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country 
Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures," Economics and Politics, vol. 7, 
1995, pp.207-27. 
Kraay, Aart, 1998, “In Search of the Macroeconomic Effects of Capital Account 
Liberalization,” unpublished; (Washington: The World Bank). 
  
Lane, Phillip, and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, “The External Wealth of Nations: Measures of 
Foreign Assets and Liabilities for Industrial and Developing Nations,” Journal of 
International Economics, forthcoming.  
 
Levine, Ross, and Sara Zervos, 1998, “Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth,” 
American Economic Review, Vol. 88, (June), pp 537–58. 
 
Levine, Ross, and David Renelt, 1992, “A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross Country Growth 
Regressions,” American Economic Review, pp. 942–63. 
 
Montiel, Peter, 1996, “Managing Economic Policy in the Face of Large Capital Inflows: 
What Have We Learned?” in Private Capital Flows to Emerging Markets After the 
Mexican Crisis, ed. by G. Calvo and M. Hochreiter, (Washington: Institute for 
International Economics), pp 189–218. 
 
Montiel, Peter, and Carmen Reinhart, 1999, “Do Capital Controls and Macroeconomic 
Policies Influence the Volume and Composition of Capital Flows? Evidence from the 
1990s,” Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp 619–35. 
 
Obstfeld, Maurice, 1986, “Capital Mobility in the World Economy: Theory and 
Measurement,” in Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Vol. 24, 
ed. by K. Brunner and A. Meltzer, (Spring). 
 
O’Donnell, Barry, 2001. “Financial Openness and Economic Performance,” (unpublished; 
Dublin, Ireland: Trinity College). 
  
Quinn, Dennis, 1997, “The Correlates of Change in International Financial Regulation,” 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 3, (September), pp. 531–51. 
  
 42
Rodrik, Dani, 1998, “Who Needs Capital-Account Convertibility?” (February), mimeo; 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University). 
  
Sachs, Jeffrey, and Andrew Warner, 1995, “Economic Reform and the Process of Global 
Integration,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 1, pp. 1–118 
(Washington: Brookings Institute). 
 
Summers, Lawrence, 2000, “International Financial Crises: Causes, Prevention, and Cures,” 
American Economic Review, Vol. 90, No. 2 (May), pp. 1–16. 
 









Table 1. Summary of Indicators of Restrictions 
Name Source  Description  Range  Years  Country  Coverage 




Constructed as an on/off indicator of the 
existence of rules/restrictions that inhibit 
cross-border flows. 
0 (never restricted) to 
 1 (always restricted) 
1967 – 1995 
after which 
format changes 
117 countries for years 1976-95  
to  
137 countries for years 1986 -95 
2. Share  AREAER, line 
E2, various 
issues 
Uses IMF measure to create proportion of 
years that capital account is judged free of 
restrictions. Can be constructed for any range, 
1966-95. 
0 (never restricted) to 
1 (always restricted) 
1967 – 1995 
after which 
format change  
117 (76-95) to 137 (86-95) 
3. Quinn  Quinn (1997)  Constructed from narrative descriptions in 
AREAER regarding capital account 
restrictions.  
Larger numbers mean less 
restricted, more open or 
meet agreements. Values in 
½ point increments, 0 - 4 
Full Sample: 
1958, 1973, 
1982, and 1988.  
63 countries of which 20 are 
advanced and 43 are developing 
countries 
4. ∆Quinn  Quinn (1997)  Difference in Quinn Indicators  Actual Ranges for Capital 
Account 
1988 – 1982; -1 to 2 
1988 – 1973; -2 to 2 
Construct from 
dates above 
63 countries 20 are advanced 
and 43 are developing countries 






Proportion of the 11 categories free of 
restrictions, averaged over the relevant period. 
0 (always restricted) to  




21 OECD countries 
6. MR Montiel  & 
Reinhart 
(1999) 
Measures the intensity of capital account 
restrictions  
0 (unrestricted),  
1 (mild restrictions), 
 2 (severe restrictions) 
Annual, 1990 - 
1996 
15 emerging markets 
7.Levine/Zervos 
and Henry 




and b)  
Dates of stock market liberalizations in 
emerging markets.  
Constructed as 0/1 dummies 
for event studies or Share of 
years open for cross-section. 
Earliest: May 
86. 
Latest: Dec. 91 
11 emerging markets 




Dates of stock market liberalizations in 
emerging markets and industrial economies. 
Constructed as 0/1 dummies 
for event studies or as share 




95 countries. 43 had some 
experience with financial 
liberalization (25 emerging 
market, 18 OECD) 
9. EW Edison  and 
Warnock 
(2001) 
One minus the ratio of the IFC investable 
index to the IFC global index 
Constructed to be between 0 
and 1 
Earliest 1988 to 
present 
29 emerging markets 
11. Capflows  Kraay (1998)   Measure based on actual capital flows  Constructed as percent of 
GDP 
  All countries with BOP Statistics 




Measure based on accumulated or stock of  
gross capital flows. 
Constructed as percent of 
GDP 
Earliest 1970 - 
1998 
70 countries, mix of advanced 





Table 2. IMF Capital Account Restriction Measure 
 
A.   Value of Share and Years When Capital Markets Open, 1986 - 1995  
(For countries that had open markets at some point in time, i.e. Share ≠ 0) 
 
A. Share  Years Open  Industrial Countries  Developing Countries 
0.1  1995  Norway  Costa Rica, Niger 
0.2  1994-95  Spain  Trinidad & Tobago 
0.3  1993-95  Portugal, Sweden  Honduras, Peru 
0.4 1992-95  Ireland   
0.5 1991-95  Finland,  Austria   
1990-95 France,  Italy    0.6 
1988-92, 1995    Ecuador 
1989-95   Guatemala  0.7 
1986-92   Uruguay 
0.8 1988-95  Denmark   
1.0  1986-95  Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
United Kingdom, United States 
Bolivia, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Panama 
 
B. The Evolution of Capital Account Restrictions, 1976-1985 
(For countries that had open markets at some point in time during this Period) 
Years Open  Industrial Countries  Years Open  Developing Countries 
1984 – 1985  Australia, New Zealand  1980 – 1981  Costa Rica  
1978 – 1985  Japan, United Kingdom  1976 – 1979   Guatemala, Honduras 
    1976 – 1984  Ecuador 
1976 – 1985  Belgium, Canada, Germany, 
Netherlands, United States 
1976 – 1985  Indonesia, Malaysia  
 







Table 3. Quinn’s Indicators of Capital Account Liberalization 
 
  
















0 (restricted)  2  1  0  0  2   –  
0.5 4 5 3 1 3 0 
1 11  9 7 4 6 1 
1.5  13  15  14  6 6 1 
2  7  13  9 0 6 1 
2.5 7 4 6 2 4 1 
3  9 7  11  2 4 3 
3.5 5 0 4 0 2 3 
4 (liberalized)  5  9  9  3   –   2 
Total  63 63 63 18 33 12 
  
















0  (restricted)  2 1 0 0 2 –   
0.5 4 5 3 1 6 0 
1 10  8 7 4 5 1 
1.5 9  14  13  6 2 1 
2  1 8 9 0 0 1 
2.5 5 1 3 2 2 1 
3  4 0 2 0 1 3 
3.5 3 0 2 0 0 3 
4 (liberalized)  4  5  3  2   –   2 
Total  42 42 42 15 15 12 
 





Table 4. Comparison of Quinn and IMF Indicators   
(Number of countries for each combination of indicators) 
Panel 1: Full Sample: Year 1973    Panel 4: Developing Countries Year 1973 
   IMF Indicator    IMF Indicator 








Quinn   0–2  36  0  36    Quinn 0–2  26  0 26 
Indicator  3–4  10 15 25    Indicator 3–4  4  12  16 
Total    46 15 61    Total   30  12 42 
Panel 2: Full Sample: Year 1982    Panel 5: Developing Countries Year 1982 
   IMF Indicator       IMF Indicator 
   0  1 
 
Total 
     0  1 
 
Total 
Quinn 0–2 38  4  42    Quinn 0–2  32 4  36 
Indicator  3–4  7 12 19    Indicator 3–4  0  6  6 
Total    45 16 61    Total   32 10 42 
Panel 3: Full Sample: Year 1988    Panel 6: Developing Countries Year 1988 
   IMF Indicator   
Total       IMF Indicator   
Total 
   0  1        0  1   
Quinn 0–2 32  0  32    Quinn 0–2  32 0  32 
Indicator  3–4  12 17 29    Indicator 3–4  2  8  10 
Total    44 17 61    Total   34  8 42 
 










Argentina 1989 Malaysia 1988 
Bangladesh NL  Mexico  1989 
Brazil 1991  Morocco  1997 
Chile 1992  Nigeria  1995 
Colombia 1991  Pakistan  1991 
Cote d’Ivoire  NL  Philippines  1991 
Egypt 1997  Portugal  1986 
Greece 1987  Sri  Lanka  1992 
India 1992  South  Africa  1992 
Indonesia 1989 Thailand 1987 
Israel  1996  Trinidad & Tobago  NL 
Jamaica NL Tunisia NL 
Jordan 1995 Turkey 1989 
Kenya NL  Venezuela  1990 
Korea 1992  Zimbabwe  1993 
Countries classified as emerging or frontier by the International Finance corporation.  
NL refers to Not Liberalized. 









Table 6. Overview of Studies of the Impact of Capital Account Liberalization on Growth 
 
Study  Countries  Lib. Measure  Dependent Variable and Estimation Method  Main Results for GDP Growth 
Quinn 1997  58  ∆Quinn, between 
1988 and 1958 
Growth in income per capita 1960 – 1989.   Cross Section, OLS.    ∆Quinn significantly raises growth in income per 
capita, though no regression is presented with both 
∆Capital Controls and ∆Openness. 
Klein & Olivei 
2000  
67  Share   Growth in income per capita, 1976 – 1995.  Cross Section, IV. 
Change in Financial Depth  (∆FD ) as a function of Share and 
then per capita income growth as a function of instrumented 
value of ∆FD (and initial FD). 
Significant effect of Share on ∆FD, though results 
seem to be driven by OECD countries in sample.  
Significant effect of instrumented values of ∆FD 
and FD on growth. 
Edwards 2001  55 to 62  Quinn in 1988; or 
∆Quinn 1988 – 
1973    
Growth in income per capita, 1980 – 1989.  Cross Section. WLS 
(1985 GDP as weight), IV.  Also uses interaction of Quinn in 
1988 and log(GDP in 1980). 
Quinn level significantly raises GDP growth.  
Interaction suggests that, at low GDP, opening 










Growth in income per capita 1973 – 81, 1982 – 87, 1988 – 92, or 
pooled for these 3 periods.  Follows Edwards (2001) but with 
OLS rather than WLS and with different instruments. 
Quinn significant for pooled results but not for 
shorter subsamples.  ∆Quinn not significant.  
Significant effect of interaction of Quinn with either 
quality of law or openness.  





Official Dates of 
Stock Market 
Liberalization  
Growth rates in income per capita for various time periods 
between 1981 and 1997, resulting in overlapping data.  
Stock market liberalization significantly contributes 
to growth in income per capita, with largest effects 
shortly after liberalization 
O’Donnell 2001  94  Share or 
Volume 
Growth in income per capita over 1971 – 1994.  Regressions 
include interaction between FD and Share, and Volume and FD. 
Neither Share nor interaction of Share and FD  
significant, but Volume sometimes significant. 
Chanda 2001  57  
non-OECD 
Share  Growth in income per capita over 1975 – 1995.  Share interacted 
with measure of ethnic heterogeneity. 
Share significantly raises growth in ethnically 
heterogeneous countries and significantly lowers it 
in ethnically homogeneous countries. 
Grilli & Milesi-
Ferretti 1995 
61  Share  Growth in income per capita for five-year non-overlapping 
periods during 1971 – 1994 period. IV estimation. 
No Evidience of a significant effect of Share on 
growth of income per capita.  
Rodrik 1998   About 100  Share  Growth in income per capita over 1975 – 1995.  Cross Section, 
OLS.   
No Evidience of a significant effect of Share on 
growth of income per capita. 
Kraay 1998  64, 94, or 
117 
Share; Quinn;  
or Volume 
Growth in income per capita over 1985 – 1997. Cross Section. 
OLS & IV.  Samples of 117 (Share); 94 (Volume); or 64 (Quinn). 
No effect of Share or Quinn on Growth.  Coefficient 
on Volume significant and positive. 
NOTES: Share is proportion of years that IMF’s AREAR shows open capital accounts.  Quinn is Quinn’s 0 – 4 measure of capital account intensity. 
∆Quinn is change in value of Quinn 0 – 4 measure. Volume is measure of volume of capital flows.  Cross Section refers to 1 observation per country.    
Table 7 
Growth and Capital Account Liberalization 
V.   OLS  VI.   IV  Dep. Var. 
∆lnY76 – 95   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
ln Y1976  -0.24 -0.31 -0.48 -0.41 -0.33 -0.35 -0.49 -0.42 
(s.e.)  (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) 
ln (Educ.)  0.12 0.12 0.16  0.22 0.15 0.13 0.15  0.14 
(s.e.)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.05) 
Invest.74 – 78  0.007  0.01 0.02 0.02 0.007  0.01 0.02 0.008 
(s.e.)  (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.01)  (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) 
∆Pop.76 – 95  -0.80 -0.90 -1.09 -1.11 -0.55 -0.97 -1.06 -0.02 
(s.e.)  (0.17) (0.17) (0.31) (0.35) (0.27) (0.18) (0.33) (0.33) 
Africa  -0.37 -0.33 -0.41 -0.45 -0.33 -0.32 -0.41 -0.35 
(s.e.)  (0.11) (0.10) (0.17) (0.17) (0.11) (0.11) (0.17) (0.13) 
Share76 – 95   0.34     0.56    
(s.e.)   (0.12)     (0.17)    
Quinn82     0.19     0.22   
(s.e.)    (0.06)     (0.06)   
∆Quinn73 – 88     0.05      
(s.e.)     (0.08)      
BHL80 – 95      0.43    1.07 
(s.e.)      (0.15)    (0.28) 
DM  p-value       0.13  0.52  0.01 
R
2  0.47 0.52 0.59 0.44 0.53 0.50 0.58 0.34 
no.  of  obs.  89 89 52 51 82 87 52 81 
Regressions include a constant (not reported).  Robust standard errors. 
Definition of Variables:  
∆lnY76 – 95 = growth in ln real per capita income, 1976 to 1995; ln Y1976 = ln real per capita income 
in 1976; ln(Educ.) = ln(secondary school enrollment rate); Invest.74 – 78 = Average Investment, 
1974 to 1978; ∆Pop.76 – 95 = Population growth, 1976 to 1995; Africa = Dummy variable for 
African countries; Share76 – 95 = Proportion of years with open capital accounts, 1976 to 1995, 
from IMF’s AREAER; Quinn82 =  0 to 4 measure of capital account openness in 1982 and 
∆Quinn73 – 88 = Difference in 0 to 4 measure of capital account openness between 1973 and 1988, 
both from Quinn (1997); BHL80 – 95 = Proportion of years between 1980 and 1995 with liberalized 
stock market, using dates of stock market liberalization from Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad 
(2001). 
Instruments for Capital Account Liberalization Measures: 
Government consumption as proportion of GDP in 1976; Imports as proportion of GDP in 1976; 
Dummy variables for Latin American countries and East Asian countries; Quinn’s 0 to 4 measure 
of capital account openness in 1973 (for Quinn82) or IMF’s AREAER 0/1 value in 1973 (for 
Share76 – 95 and for BHL80 – 95). 
 
Bold denotes p-value of coefficient 0.05 or less.   










Differential Effects by OECD Membership or Region 
Dep. Var. 













ln Y1976  -0.29 -0.44  -0.35  -0.29  -0.37  -0.24 
(s.e.) (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.07) (0.09)  (0.06) 
ln (Educ.)  0.13 0.19  0.14  0.12  0.16  0.14 
(s.e.) (0.05)  (0.08)  (0.05)  (0.05) (0.09)  (0.05) 
Invest.74 – 78  0.01  0.02  0.004 0.01  0.009  0.002 
(s.e.) (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.004) 
∆Pop.76 – 95  -1.00 -1.33  -0.17  -1.03 -1.16  -0.69 
(s.e.) (0.20)  (0.42)  (0.33)  (0.31) (0.37)  (0.26) 
Africa  -0.30 -0.35  -0.22  -0.33 -0.43  -0.22 
(s.e.) (0.11)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.11) (0.10)  (0.11) 
Openness Measures by Region 
OECD  0.20  0.13 0.92  0.14  0.08 0.22 
(s.e.) (0.11)  (0.05)  (0.28)  (0.11) (0.05)  (0.13) 
non –OECD  0.43 0.21  1.67      
(s.e.) (0.16)  (0.07)  (0.49)       
East Asia       0.69 0.26  1.15 
(s.e.)       (0.12) (0.04)  (0.17) 
Latin America        -0.25  0.05 0.20 
(s.e.)       (0.11) (0.08)  (0.27) 
Other non–OECD        0.52 0.14  0.82 
(s.e.)       (0.38) (0.12)  (0.33) 
DM p-value 














2  0.53 0.61  0.37  0.61  0.72  0.62 
no. of obs.  89   52  81  89   52  82 
All estimates using OLS or IV with robust standard errors.  Row labeled “p-value of 
sum” is p-value of sum of capital account liberalization and capital account liberalization 
times OECD dummy variable coefficients.  Regressions include a constant (not reported).  
All variables as listed in notes to Table 7.  Gov. Rep. = Knack and Keefer (1995) measure 
of degree to which governments do not repudiate contracts, range is 1 – 10 and larger 
values indicate government less likely to repudiate contract. 
 
Bold denotes p-value of coefficient 0.05 or less.   










Including Government Reputation as a Regressor 
Dep. Var. 













ln Y1976  -0.41 -0.42  -0.40  -0.36  -0.33  -0.37 
(s.e.) (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.06) (0.05)  (0.05) 
ln (Educ.)  0.16 0.12  0.13  0.15  0.10  0.13 
(s.e.) (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04) (0.06)  (0.04) 
Invest.74 – 78  0.004  0.01  -0.0002 -0.001  0.001  -0.002 
(s.e.) (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
∆Pop.76 – 95 -0.09  -0.46  -0.02 -0.10  -0.43  -0.01 
(s.e.) (0.25)  (0.07)  (0.21)  (0.24) (0.15)  (0.21) 
Africa  -0.46  -0.46  -0.48 -0.50  -0.53  -0.49 
(s.e.) (0.08)  (0.33)  (0.05)  (0.07) (0.06)  (0.05) 
Gov’t. Reputation  0.17 0.18  0.17  0.14  0.14  0.15 
(s.e.) (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.04) (0.03)  (0.03) 
Openness Measures by Region 
OECD -0.09 -0.06  0.05  -0.09  -0.07  0.05 
(s.e.) (0.09)  (0.05)  (0.09)  (0.08) (0.04)  (0.09) 
non –OECD  0.22  0.06  0.54      
(s.e.) (0.12)  (0.06)  (0.12)       
East Asia       0.43 0.13  0.72 
(s.e.)       (0.11) (0.02)  (0.11) 
Latin America        -0.23  -0.05 0.18 
(s.e.)       (0.09) (0.04)  (0.28) 
Other non–OECD       0.76  0.03 0.28 
(s.e.)       (0.39) (0.06)  (0.30) 
DM p-value  0.23  0.59  0.15  0.41  0.53  0.27 
R
2  0.74 0.78  0.82  0.79  0.86  0.84 
no. of obs.  71   50  68  71   50  68 
All estimates using OLS with robust standard errors.  Row labeled “p-value of sum” is p-
value of sum of capital account liberalization and capital account liberalization times 
OECD dummy variable coefficients.  Regressions include a constant (not reported).  All 
variables as listed in notes to Table 7.  Gov. Rep. = Knack and Keefer (1995) measure of 
degree to which governments do not repudiate contracts, range is 1 – 10 and larger values 
indicate government less likely to repudiate contract. 
 
Bold denotes p-value of coefficient 0.05 or less.   









































Figure 1.  Summary of Measures of Capital Account 
Openness
The two measures of liberalization show similar overall patterns, but the 

























































   Sources: IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions, various issues; International Financial Statistics; and IMF staff 
calculations.
     The restriction measure is calculated as the "average" value of the on/off 
measure for the country group. The openness measure is calculated as the 
average stock of accumulated capital flows (as percent of GDP) in a country 
group.
     For country coverage, see Table 4.2.
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